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Placement Director	Gianluca Violante	violante@princeton.edu	+1 (609) 258-4003
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EDUCATION

Ph.D. Candidate in Economics 2015 – present
Princeton University, USA

M.A. in Economics (summa cum laude) 2013 – 2015
New Economic School, Moscow, Russia

B.A. in Applied Mathematics and Physics 2001 – 2005
Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Moscow, Russia

REFERENCES

Professor Wolfgang Pesendorfer Department of Economics Princeton University +1 (609) 258-4017 pesendor@princeton.edu	Professor Faruk Gul Department of Economics Princeton University +1 (609) 258-4009 fgul@princeton.edu	Professor Pietro Ortoleva Department of Economics Princeton University +1 (609) 986-6895 pietro.ortoleva@princeton.edu
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RESEARCH AND TEACHING FIELDS

Primary **Microeconomic Theory**
Secondary **Political Economy**

JOB MARKET PAPER

· **Slow and Easy: a Theory of Browsing**

Abstract. An agent needs to choose the best alternative drawn randomly with replacement from a menu of unknown composition. The agent is boundedly rational and employs an automaton decision rule: she has finitely many memory states, and, in each, she can inquire about some attribute of the currently drawn alternative and transition (possibly stochastically) either to another state or to a decision. Defining the complexity of a decision rule by the number of transitions, I study the minimal complexity of a decision rule that allows the agent to choose the best alternative from any menu with probability arbitrarily close to one. Agents in my model differ in their *languages*—collections of binary attributes used to describe alternatives. My first result shows that the tight lower bound on complexity among all languages is $3\lceil\log_2(m)\rceil$, where m is the number of alternatives valued distinctly. My second result provides a linear upper bound. Finally, I call *adaptive* a language that facilitates additive utility representation with the smallest number of attributes. My third result shows that an adaptive language is always *simple*: it admits the least complex decision rule that solves the choice problem. When $(3/4) \cdot 2^n < m \leq 2^n$ for a natural n , a language is simple if and only if it is adaptive.

WORKING PAPERS

- **Framing and Ambiguity**

Abstract. In this paper, we develop and analyze a model of framing under ambiguity. Frames are circumstances, unobservable to the analyst, that shape the agent's perception of the relevant ambiguity. The analyst observes a choice correspondence that represents the set of possible choices under the various decision frames. Our first result provides axioms that are equivalent to a multi-multiple prior model; that is, there is a collection of multiple prior models with a common utility index so that the choice correspondence consists of the optimizers of the models in the collection. Furthermore, we characterize the extent to which the analyst can identify the parameters of the model, that is, the extent to which the frames can be inferred from behavior. To capture the degree to which frames affect choice, we introduce two comparative notions; the first says that one agent is *more decisive* than another if the former's choice correspondence is a subset of the latter's. The second, less demanding notion says that an agent is *more consistent* than another agent if the former has a unique choice whenever the latter does. We characterize both comparative measures in terms of the model parameters. Agents who recognize that they are subject to different frames may learn by combining their frames into a single model. Our final result characterizes the behavioral implications of this form of learning.

- **Who Cares More? Allocation with Diverse Preference Intensities** (with Pietro Ortoleva and Leeat Yariv)

Abstract. Goods and services—public housing, medical appointments, schools—are often allocated to individuals who rank them similarly but differ in their preference intensities. We characterize optimal allocation rules when individual preferences are known and when they are not. Several insights emerge. First-best allocations may involve assigning some agents “lotteries” between high- and low-ranked goods. When preference intensities are private information, second-best allocations always involve such lotteries and, crucially, may coincide with first-best allocations. Furthermore, second-best allocations may entail disposal of services. We discuss a market-based alternative and show how it differs.

WORK IN PROGRESS

- **Brand Loyalty, Status Quo Bias and Behavioral Optimization** (with Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer)

Abstract. We demonstrate how a tendency to overvalue the status quo arises in response to cognitive limitations, specifically to bounded memory and an imperfect ability to discern differences among options. We analyze a model of absent-minded decision making and show how brand-loyalty develops more rapidly than in a fully rational benchmark.

- **Random Choice with Framing Effects: a Bayesian Model**

Abstract. A Bayesian decision maker learns different aspects of her preferences in each decision frame. Thus, the frames are interpreted as Blackwell experiments associated with the subjective state space of the agent. Under a wide range of assumptions on what the analyst knows, any internal random choice can be interpreted in such way. However, when the dimension of the subjective state space is limited, the analyst observes the frames, and the set of alternatives is large enough, the choice frequencies in various frames should be connected in a way that generalizes the linear inequalities from Falmagne (1978) to a setting with decision frames.

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant for Professor Pietro Ortoleva	2018 – 2019
Research Assistant for Professors Wolfgang Pesendorfer and Faruk Gul	Summer 2018
Research Assistant for Professor Stephen Morris	2016 – 2017

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Princeton University	TA, <i>Microeconomic Theory</i> (undergraduate) for Professor Sylvain Chassang	Spring 2021
	TA, <i>Microeconomic Theory I</i> (graduate) for Professor Faruk Gul	2017 – 2018
	TA, <i>Introduction to Microeconomics</i> (undergraduate) for Professor Kelly Noonan	Spring 2018
New Economic School	TA, <i>Microeconomic Theory I-V</i> (graduate)	2014 – 2015

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Referee	<i>Journal of Economic Theory</i>
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AWARDS

Princeton University	Marimar & Cristina Torres Prize for Best 3rd-year Graduate Research Paper	2018
	Stephen Goldfeld Memorial Graduate Summer Fellowship	2017
	William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Summer Research Grant	2016 – 2021
	Princeton University Graduate Fellowship	2015 – 2022
New Economic School	Don Patinkin Prize	2015
	Best Student Paper Award	2015
	Petr Aven Scholarship	2014 – 2015
	British Petroleum Scholarship	2013 – 2014
	NES Academic Fellowship	2013 – 2015

OTHER

Other work experience	Private Sector, Russia	2007-2013
Citizenship	Russia	
Family	Married, 1 child	